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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
WILLIAM R. LYDAY, : Case No. 970078-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of the controlled 
substances methamphetamine and marijuana, within 1,000 feet of a public park, 
respectively, a second degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996 and Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that 
defendant and codefendant jointly and constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine and marijuana seized from the cab of a pickup over which they 
had exclusive control? 
The Court need not reach defendant's sufficiency challenge due to his 
failure to properly marshal the supporting evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom 
and to demonstrate their inadequacy. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 
1991). If the Court deems defendant's challenge adequate for review, it should view the 
evidence and the inferences from it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State 
v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). The Court may reverse for insufficient 
evidence "only when the evidence is so inclusive or so inherently improbably that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime." Id. (citation omitted). See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions are 
contained in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of the controlled substances 
methamphetamine and marijuana, within 1,000 feet of a public park, respectively, a 
second degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8 (1996 and Supp. 1996) (R. 1-2). 
2 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged.1 The trial court 
imposed a l-to-15 year term for the felony count and a concurrent 6 month term for the 
misdemeanor count (R. 68-70).2 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 71). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). 
On 15 May 1996, defendant and codefendant Timmerman were arrested on 
outstanding warrants by Brigham City police investigating a citizen complaint that the 
two were stealing bricks from alongside the railroad tracks (R. 201-209). When the 
officers first approached, codefendant Timmerman was sitting in a parked pickup truck 
and defendant was approximately 50 yards distant, walking toward the truck (R. 202-
203). 
As defendant approached, Officer Gerbich asked him if he had been driving 
and defendant claimed that he had not (R. 204). Defendant presented a Utah 
Identification Card and when asked, responded that he had no license and that he hoped 
1
 The verdict form appearing in this record pertains to codefendant Brent 
William Timmerman (see R. 65). The verdict form pertaining to defendant is found in 
the companion case, State v. Timmerman, Case No. 970076-CA at (R. 61). 
2
 There is no reason apparent in the record that the misdemeanor sentence 
was entered for a Class B conviction, rather than a Class A conviction, a result 
inconsistent with the charging information and the jury verdict (compare R. 1-2, and R. 
68-70). Therefore, the case should be remanded so that the trial court can enter a class A 
misdemeanor judgment and sentence that conforms with the jury verdict. 
3 
codefendant Timmerman did (R. 206). The officers then approached codefendant 
Timmerman who was still seated in the pickup and asked for his identification (id). 
Codefendant Timmerman, like defendant, produced a Utah Identification Card (id.) 
When asked about his driver's license, codefendant Timmerman said that it had been 
revoked or suspended (id.). A computer check for driver's licenses and outstanding 
warrants confirmed that defendant had no license and that codefendant Timmerman's 
license had been revoked for an alcohol violation (id.). Additionally, both defendants had 
outstanding warrants (id.). 
Following the arrest of defendant and codefendant Timmerman on the 
outstanding warrants, Officer Broadhead searched the cab of the pickup and found 
controlled substances (R. 209). In plain sight on the floor of the passenger area where 
codefendant Timmerman had been sitting, the officer found a hard box of Camel 
cigarettes (R. 209-11). Upon opening the cigarette box the officer found a small hand-
rolled cigarette that smelled like, and appeared to be marijuana, sitting on top of a plastic 
bag that had been wadded up and placed inside (R. 210). Underneath this baggie there 
was a second baggie containing a brown colored substance which the officer, based on his 
experience, believed was crank or methamphetamine (R. 211). 
Also in plain sight, the officer saw approximately a 1/4 inch of a ziploc 
baggie protruding from a Kleenex box sitting on the transmission hump (R. 214,227). 
Officer Broadhead pushed the Kleenex inside away to reveal a quarter-sized ziploc baggie 
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containing methamphetamine (R. 215). The cab of the pickup was otherwise empty, 
except for an eyeglass case found on the passenger side floor (R. 226). 
Both defendants denied any knowledge of the seized drugs (R. 228). 
Rather, they claimed to have borrowed the truck from Barbara Evans, and to have driven 
to the railroad tracks from Ogden earlier that morning for the purpose of collecting bricks 
(R.239). 
The officers transported the defendants to jail, but did not impound the 
truck because defendants claimed that Evans would reclaim it (R. 220-21). When the 
truck remained adjacent to the railroad tracks for the next 24 hours, police impounded it 
(R.220). 
The state crime lab confirmed that the brown substance in the baggies was 
approximately 141 milligrams of methamphetamine and that the partially burned, hand-
rolled cigarette contained marijuana (R. 249-52). Based on his training and experience, 
Officer Broadhead estimated that a 141 milligrams of methamphetamine had an 
approximate street value of $75.00 (R. 224). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's sufficiency challenge should be rejected because he has not 
met the heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom that support the jury verdict and then demonstrating that it is insufficient. Even 
if the Court considers the merits of defendant's challenge, the Court must construe the 
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facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. So viewed, the evidence is sufficient. 
ARGUMENT 
THE JURY REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT AND CODEFENDANT JOINTLY AND 
CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED THE $75.00 WORTH 
OF DRUGS FOUND IN THE CAB OF THE PICKUP OVER 
WHICH THEY HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL 
A. Constructive Possession Standard 
Actual physical possession is not necessary to convict for possession of 
controlled substances. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,318 (Utah 1985). A conviction may 
be based upon constructive possession of controlled substances when drugs are found "in 
a place or under circumstances indicating that the defendant's have the ability and intent 
to exercise dominion and control." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,131-32 (Utah 1987). 
That is, there must be a "sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and 
control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. This nexus may be established through circumstantial 
evidence, State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981), including the proximity of a 
defendant to the drugs, and whether the drugs are in plain view. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 
1386,1388 (Utah 1991). Codefendants may jointly, constructively possess contraband. 
Carlson. 635 P.2d at 74. 
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B. Joint Constructive Possession Adequately Established 
Here, defendant and codefendant had exclusive control of the pickup at the 
time the drugs were seized from the cab area. The Kleenex and cigarette boxes in which 
the drugs were found were easily accessible to defendants inside the cab of the pickup 
during their drive from Ogden to the railroad tracks in Brigham City. Moreover, 1/4 inch 
of one of the seized baggies protruded from the Kleenex box which was sitting on the 
transmission hump in view of anyone in the pickup. The interior of the pickup was 
otherwise clean, the only other object found being an eyeglass case. These facts, together 
with the estimated $75.00 street value of the seized drugs, and the fact that Evans never 
came to retrieve her truck, suggest that the drugs were not inadvertently left in the pickup 
by another individual. As argued by the prosecutor below, a drug user is not going to 
leave his drugs in the truck "so that anyone walking by could see [them]," or "where 
anyone could pick [them] up , . . . and throw [them] away, especially when those items 
had value. Not only monetary value, but some intrinsic value to people who use drugs... 
A drug user is not going to leave his drugs lying around for someone else to find'' (R. 
266-67). Based on the facts of this case and the fair inferences therefrom, the jury 
reasonably concluded that defendant and codefendant Timmerman possessed the seized 
drugs. 
C. Failure to Marshal 
In claiming a paucity of the evidence, defendant wholly ignores the above 
reasonable inferences which support the jury's verdict. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-9. In order 
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to establish a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, it is defendant's burden to marshal 
all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in support of the verdict and 
demonstrate that, even viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). Indeed, "the process of marshaling evidence 
serves the important function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad 
deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Such deference is especially appropriate where 
the fact finder is a jury, whose common sense is a valued buffer between the parties." 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). Because defendant ignores the 
evidence and inferences favorable to the jury verdict here, he fails to meet his heavy 
marshaling burden and his sufficiency claim should be rejected. See State v. Scheel, 823 
P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to consider sufficiency challenge due to 
defendant's failure to marshal the evidence supporting his conviction and to demonstrate 
why it was so inconclusive that a reasonable jury could not have convicted him). 
D. No Other Culpable Individual 
Even if the Court should determine to reach the merits of defendant's 
sufficiency challenge, the evidence is adequate to establish that defendant and 
codefendant jointly and constructively possessed the seized drugs. This is an admittedly 
close case because the methamphetamine and marijuana were discovered inside benign 
containers. However, the fact that the narcotic character of the substances was not 
immediately apparent is not necessarily detrimental to the State's case. As detailed 
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above, in Part B, supra, the drugs were easily accessible to the defendants who had 
exclusive control of the pickup that morning. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388. And, it is 
unlikely, due to the $75.00 street value of the drugs, the uncluttered appearance of the 
cab, and the fact that Evans never appeared to claim the truck, that the drugs had been 
inadvertently left in the pickup by another party. 
More importantly, the evidence in this case does not point toward any other 
culpable individual. It is therefore distinguishable from the Fox case upon which 
defendant relies. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. In Fox, police searched a home and adjacent 
green house uncovering 2,850 marijuana plants. 709 P.2d at 318. The home belonged to 
Gary Fox, but his brother Clive apparently had sleeping quarters in the home. Id. at 318, 
320. Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted both Gary and Clive for possession 
of a controlled substance. Id. at 317-18. On appeal, the supreme court overturned Give's 
conviction due to insufficient evidence. Id. at 320. The supreme court determined that 
collectively the facts of the case pointed toward Gary, not Clive, as the culprit: Gary 
owned the property, Gary's room contained marijuana, drug paraphernalia and a book 
entitled A Marijuana Grower's Guide. Id. at 318. While Clive may have had knowledge 
of the existence of marijuana on the premises, such knowledge failed to indicate that he 
was other than a bystander to his brother's criminality. Id. at 320. The comparatively 
overwhelming evidence of Gary's dominion and control over the home destroyed any 
inference that Clive jointly and constructively possessed the marijuana. Id. 
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A case not cited by defendant, State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 
1991), supports this distinction. Salas was convicted by a jury for cocaine possession 
after police found a package of cocaine hidden in the back seat of the car he was driving. 
820 P.2d 1386,1386-87 (Utah App. 1991). This court reversed Salas' conviction finding 
that the furtive movements of a backseat passenger immediately prior to the traffic stop 
and the recovery of the cocaine from a crevice in the backseat, an area inaccessible to 
Salas as the driver, rendered the evidence insufficient to establish that Salas knew about 
the cocaine. Id at 1388-89. The evidence suggested instead that the backseat passenger 
hid the cocaine, which defeated the jury's inference that Salas also constructively 
possessed it. 
Unlike the defendants in Fox and Salas, the evidence supports the jury's 
determination that the defendants jointly possessed the drugs seized from the cab of the 
pickup. Furthermore, defendant and codefendant Timmerman did not implicate the other, 
and did not point to another individual as a more likely culprit. Indeed, there is no 
evidence linking the drugs discovered in the pickup to any person other than defendants, 
the two people who had sole control of the pickup that morning. Although defendants 
claimed that Evans would retrieve the truck, she did not do so. Further, the drugs were 
found in two of just three items found inside the cab of the pickup, a Kleenex and a 
cigarette box sitting in plain view on the transmission hump and floor area. 
The facts that defendant and codefendant Timmerman were cooperative and 
that police did not detect the odor of marijuana as they approached the pickup (R. 230-
m 
32), do not destroy the jury's reasonable inference that the defendants' jointly and 
constructively possessed the drugs. The odor of marijuana may be probative of a 
possession charge, but it is not determinative. Cf State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041,1043-
44 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that possession statute does not require possession of a 
useable amount of narcotic). The jury was also entitled to ignore the defendants' self-
serving statements that they knew nothing about the drugs. Cf Carlson, 635 P.2d at 74 
(stating that trial court is not obliged to accept witnesses testimony). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom 
support the jury's determination that defendant and codefendant Timmerman jointly and 
constructively possessed the drugs seized from the cab of the pickup. This Court should 
so hold, thereby according the jury verdict proper deference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Ik September 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(25) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet. 
History: C. 1*53, SS-37-7.S, enacted by L. Effective Date*. — Lswt 1995, eh. 333,14 
1995, eh. 833, i 3. makes the act effective on July 1,1995. 
68-37.8- Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) s substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession it open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
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substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency* means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; •* 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or H, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A xnisdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted tinder Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of maryuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. l)pon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of s class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii)is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter, 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any met declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of aociety, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to Vi the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 
76-S-203.5. 
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) Thi6 section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: I* 1*71, ch. 145,1 fc 1972, eh. t2, 
I 1; 1977, ch. * M 6; 1979, eh. 12, I 6; 19S5, 
ch. 146,1 1; 1986, ch. 196,1 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
f 100; 1987, ch. 190, I S; 1988, ch. 95, i 1; 
1989, ch. SO, I 2; 1989, ch 56,1 1; 1989, ch. 
176,1 1; 1989, ch. 167,1 1; 1989, ch. 901,1 1; 
1990, ch. 161, f 1; 1990, ch. 163, I * 1990, 
ch. 163,1 8; 1991, ch. SO, I 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
f 4; 1991, ch. 968, i 7; 1995, ch. 984,1 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last 
sentence is Subjection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-
section (9Xd) which read "Nothing in this sec-
tion in any way lixniu or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8*1002." 
Croes-Referenee*.—Cities and towns, pro* 
hibitioni of aaks of narcotics to minors, { 10-
8-47. 
Psychotoxic chemical solvent*, penalties for 
use or sale, | 76-10*101 et seq. 
Sentencing for felonies, | ( 76-3-201, 76-3-
203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, f { 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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68-87-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 87a, 87b, 87c, or 87d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, S7a, 37b, 37c, or S7d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with £ve or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified an Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXrv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) maryuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter, or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalty 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
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unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or poet-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections MXaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center, 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4XaXi) through (viii); or 
(z) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorised by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(6) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima fade evidence that • 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
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(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, is good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement Officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1*71, cb. 145, f S; 1*72, cb- 22, 
I l;1977,ch.2M *; IS7S, cb-12,1 ft; 1*85, 
cb-14*, I 1; 1SS6, cb. 1*6, | 1; 1*87, eh. S2, 
I 100; 1*87, cb. ISO, I S; 1*88, eh. S5, I 1; 
1*8$, eh. 50,1 2; 1*88, cb. S6,1 I; 1SSS, cb, 
178, t l;l*6S,eb,lS7,f 2; 1*89, cb. S01, | 1; 
1**0, cb, 161,1 1; 1**0, cb. 163, I *; l**0f 
eh. 1SS, I 2; 1**1, cb. SO, I 1; 1*91, cb. 1*8, 
I 4; 1*91, cb. S68, I 7; 1**5, cb. 2*4, I 1; 
1S*6, cb. 1, | S; 1*97, cb. Si, I S. 
Amendment Note*. — The 1*96 amend-
sent, affective January 31, 1*96, aubatituted 
•minor* for •child" and nS-Sa-lWfbr ^S-Sa^* 
in Subaection (2XaXv). 
The 1997 amendment, affective May 5,1*97, 
deleted fonner Subaection (IXaXiii) concerning 
possession in the course of buaineaa, redeaig-
sating aubaectioni accordingly, added Subaec-
tion (lXaXiv); inaertad "or a controliad eub-
Drug-tree tones. 
—Burden of proof 
Search and eeixure. 
Sentencing. 
Citad. 
Drug -free soma. 
••^Burden OT proof* 
Tbe penalty enhancement provision, whieh 
was enacted for tbe purpoae of creating "drug* 
free tones* around schools, incorporataa quae* 
tiooj of location and distance into tbe underly-
ing offense, and tbe state must prove those 
additional facta to tbe aame trier of fact wbo 
ftnds defendant! guilty of poaaeaaion, distribu-
tion, or manufacture of a oontroUad aubatanca. 
8ute v. Powatnik, SIS R2d 146 (Utab Ct App. 
1996). 
Search and eeiriire* 
Trial court properly denied defendants mo-
tion to suppress marijuana and drug parapber-
stance analog* in Subaectionj (lXbXi) and 
(2XbXii)i added Subaection (1XO; deleted 
former Subaection (2XaXiii) concerning being 
present where oontroUad aubataneaa are being 
seed, renumbering fubeectioni accordingly; de-
lated former Subaectionj (2XaXv) to (vii) con-
oarning praacription offenaet; deleted former 
Subaection (S) titled •Prohibited acta C • Pen-
alties * renumbering and redesignating tbe fol-
lowing aubaectioni accordingly; deleted former 
Subaection (eXaXiv) concerning furnishing 
false information, redesignating aubaectioni 
accordingly; aubatituted "probation" for "parole 
until tbe minimum term of imprisonment un-
der this subaection has been served" at tbe and 
of present Subaection (4Kb); deleted former 
Subaection (9) concerning sentencing, renum-
bering accordingly; and made numerous stylis-
tic changes throughout tbe section. 
Italia that bad not been seized in an illegal 
eearch and seizure. Bute v. South, S32 P£d 622 
(Utab Ct App. 1*97). 
Because tbe public safety exception to tbe 
Miranda requirement concerns tbe safety of tbe 
general public and not tbe safety of a particular 
defendant, it did not apply to tbe situation 
where defendant, convicted of possession, re* 
eponded affirmatively to officers question 
whether be was on heroin before be was 
mirandiied; thus, statement should have been 
suppreaaed. State v. Montoya, S14 Utab Adv. 
Rep. 54 (Utah Ct App. 1997). 
Because probable cause and exigent drcum* 
stances, requiring initial and then further in* 
ventory eearch of defendant's car, were nonex-
istent once vehicle was impounded, tbe denial 
of defendant's motion to auppreas heroin die-
covered in oar was reversed. State •.Montoya, 
S14 Utab Adv. Rep. 64 (Utab Ct App. 1997). 
Although alone, each of the factors of past 
criminal activity, nervoueness, anger, and trav-
elling back from a known drug community 
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